

重要インフラ情報セキュリティ  
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# リスクの心理学

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## Why Study Risk Perception?

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Studies of risk perception examine the opinions people express when they are asked, in various ways, to characterize and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. This research aims to aid risk analysis and societal decision making by (i) improving methods for eliciting opinions about risk, (ii) providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards, and (iii) improving the communication of risk information among laypeople, technical experts, and policy makers.

KEY WORDS: risk perception; risk assessment; risk management; risk policy; acceptable risk.

### INTRODUCTION

For people and institutions in industrialized societies, the question "How safe is safe enough?" appears likely to be one of the major policy issues of the 1980s. The daily discovery of new hazards and the widespread publicity given them is causing more and more individuals to see themselves as the victims, rather than as the beneficiaries, of technology. These fears and the opposition to technology that they cause have puzzled and frustrated industry promoters and policy-makers, who believe that the public's pursuit of a "zero-risk" society threatens the nation's political and economic stability. Political Scientist Aaron Wildavsky<sup>(1)</sup> offers one expression of the technologists' concerns:

How extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best-protected, most resourceful civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its way to becoming the most frightened. Has there ever been, one wonders, a society that produced more uncertainty more often about everyday life? Is it our environment or ourselves that have changed? Would

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people like us have had this sort of concern in the past? ... today, there are risks from numerous small dams far exceeding those from nuclear reactors. Why is the one feared and not the other? Is it just that we are used to the old or are some of us looking differently at essentially the same sorts of experience?

Over the past few years, a small number of researchers have been attempting to answer such questions by examining the opinions that people express when they are asked, in a variety of ways, to evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. This research aims (i) to discover what people mean when they say that something is (or is not) "risky," and to determine what factors underlie those perceptions, (ii) to develop a theory of risk perception that predicts how people will respond to new hazards and management strategies (e.g., warning labels, regulations, substitutes), and (iii) to develop techniques for assessing the complex and subtle opinions that people have about risk. If successful, this research should aid policy-makers by improving communication between them and the lay public, anticipating public responses to experiences and events (e.g., a good safety record, an accident), and directing educational efforts.

## リスク心理学の基本的な問題意識

→ *How safe is safe enough?*

(意識)情報セキュリティはどれくらいのレベルまで高めれば、ユーザーは納得するのか？

ヒューマンエラーはどれくらい少なければ、ユーザーは安心するのか？

おそらく、納得や安心をもたらす一定のリスクレベルはない

e.g.わが国の食中毒死亡者数の推移

1960年前後 0.27/10万人

1980年前後 0.017/10万人

2000年前後 0.004/10万人

つまり、食の安全は高まっているのに、安心は低下

他にも、平均寿命は延び、交通事故は減少し、治安も悪化していない、etc. ~しかし、各領域で不安は高まっている(らしい)

おそらく、情報セキュリティについても「これで十分安心」という特定のリスクレベルというのはないのではないか？

もちろん、「セキュリティレベルの高さ」と  
「ユーザーの安心」は無関係ではなく、セ  
キュリティレベルが高いことは、安心の必要  
条件だろう

でも、それだけでは不十分で、安心を得るに  
は、プラスアルファの取り組みが必要

それは何か？

その答えは、おそらく「信頼」

→ユーザーにとって情報セキュリティは外部  
依存性、専門性の高い領域

依存する外部の専門家次第で、自分たちが危険に陥る。したがって、依存する他者を信頼できれば安心できるし、納得がいく

ヒューマンエラーを低減させ、セキュリティを高める努力はもちろん、必要

けれども、ヒューマンエラーをゼロにすることはできないし、ゼロにならないことを前提とすべき

その上で、信頼(≡安心)を得るための(セキュリティレベルをあげることは別の)努力が必要

では、信頼は何によって導かれるのか？